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Background: A multidisciplinary and multi-institutional working group applied the Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) approach to the actively scanned proton beam radiotherapy process implemented at CNAO
(Centro Nazionale di Adroterapia Oncologica), aiming at preventing accidental exposures to the patient.
Methods: FMEA was applied to the treatment planning stage and consisted of three steps: i) identification of the
involved sub-processes; ii) identification and ranking of the potential failure modes, together with their causes and
effects, using the risk probability number (RPN) scoring system, iii) identification of additional safety measures to be
proposed for process quality and safety improvement. RPN upper threshold for little concern of risk was set at 125.
Results: Thirty-four sub-processes were identified, twenty-two of them were judged to be potentially prone to
one or more failure modes. A total of forty-four failure modes were recognized, 52% of them characterized by an
RPN score equal to 80 or higher. The threshold of 125 for RPN was exceeded in five cases only. The most critical
sub-process appeared related to the delineation and correction of artefacts in planning CT data. Failures associated
to that sub-process were inaccurate delineation of the artefacts and incorrect proton stopping power assignment
to body regions. Other significant failure modes consisted of an outdated representation of the patient anatomy, an
improper selection of beam direction and of the physical beam model or dose calculation grid. The main effects of
these failures were represented by wrong dose distribution (i.e. deviating from the planned one) delivered to the
patient. Additional strategies for risk mitigation, easily and immediately applicable, consisted of a systematic
information collection about any known implanted prosthesis directly from each patient and enforcing a short
interval time between CT scan and treatment start. Moreover, (i) the investigation of dedicated CT image
reconstruction algorithms, (ii) further evaluation of treatment plan robustness and (iii) implementation of
independent methods for dose calculation (such as Monte Carlo simulations) may represent novel solutions to
increase patient safety.
Conclusions: FMEA is a useful tool for prospective evaluation of patient safety in proton beam radiotherapy. The
application of this method to the treatment planning stage lead to identify strategies for risk mitigation in addition
to the safety measures already adopted in clinical practice.
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New technologies have been introduced in radiation
therapy (RT) with the aim of improving treatment out-
come by means of dose distributions which conform
more closely to the target volumes. Highly conformal
dose distributions allow for dose escalation in the target
volumes without increasing the dose to neighbouring
normal tissues, or for a reduction in the dose to normal
tissues without decreasing the dose to the target. In par-
ticular, actively scanned proton beams represent a novel
irradiation technique taking full advantage from the
physical interaction properties of these particles with tis-
sues and advanced delivery modality to generate very
sharp dose gradients in three dimensions, with many de-
grees of freedom available at the planning level.
The increased complexity related to the technological
and process changes places new demands on quality as-
surance (QA) programs, as well as innovative instrumen-
tation and detectors for beam characterization and
checks [1-5]. Moreover, new approaches of safety culture
are required, since complexity may also increase the sen-
sitivity to uncertainties and risk for accidental exposures.
Radiotherapy-related errors are unfortunately not un-
common, even in the countries with the highest level of
health-care resources [6]. A number of accidents in
conventional external radiotherapy have been extensively
investigated and the lessons learned have been dissemi-
nated by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), as well as the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP) [7,8]. In order to fully
assess and manage the risks of accidental exposures de-
riving from the use of innovative radiotherapy method-
ologies, retrospective approaches are not fully adequate,
since they have the intrinsic limitation of being confined
to the reported experiences, thus leaving unreported
events or latent risks unaddressed. This is particularly
true for new methodologies, for which safety reports
may not be available. Prospective approaches, widely ap-
plied in high-risk industry, have to be implemented to
find out all the elements that could go wrong and iden-
tify, a priori, all the potential hazards that might occur
during a radiotherapy treatment. Recently, the interest
in using these methodologies for safety assessment in
complex medical practices, like modern radiotherapy, is
gaining importance and the literature on this topic is
rapidly increasing [9-13].
Following the general guidelines proposed by the World
Health Organization (WHO) [6], the RT treatment
process can be divided into ten stages: 1) assessment of
patient, 2) decision to treat, 3) treatment protocol pre-
scription, 4) positioning and immobilization, 5) simula-
tion, imaging and volume determination, 6) planning, 7)
treatment information transfer, 8) patient set-up, 9) treat-
ment delivery, 10) treatment verification and monitoring.The aim of this work was the application of the Failure
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) prospective ap-
proach to actively scanned proton beam radiotherapy,
representing the most advanced irradiation modality
using this type of particle. The specific processes
implemented at CNAO Foundation (Centro Nazionale
di Adroterapia Oncologica) was considered for the ana-
lysis. The study was focused on the treatment planning
stage, since it was considered one of the most critical
phases within the whole RT process, as also reported in
the WHO Technical Manual [6]. The applied procedure
included the definition of the involved sub-processes
and fault trees, the assignment of a score for each poten-
tial failure mode and finally the suggestion of additional
safety measures for process improvement. Risk analysis
for the remaining nine stages, as well as for the commis-
sioning of the treatment machine and treatment plan-
ning system (TPS), is out of the scope of this work and
deserves being addressed elsewhere.
Methods
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is a proactive risk analysis method, widely
employed in industry and recently also recommended by
the ICRP and Task Group 100 of the American Associ-
ation of Physicists in Medicine (AAPM) as a powerful
tool in modern radiation oncology [14].
In this study, FMEA was applied as a first step to iden-
tify all the sub-processes involved in the treatment plan-
ning stage of the proton beam RT process (i.e. the
process tree), what could go wrong (i.e. the failure
modes) and the potential causes and effects of each fail-
ure. Then, since the goal of FMEA is to rank the failure
modes in order of importance, three indexes were
assigned for each failure mode: the occurrence rating
(O), the severity rating (S), and the detectability rating
(D). The strategies and solutions currently applied at
CNAO to mitigate the risk in the routine clinical prac-
tice are reported and were taken into account in the as-
sessment of those indexes. A ten-point scale was used to
score each category, ten being the number indicating the
most severe, most frequent and least detectable failure
mode, respectively. In particular, as a guideline, the rank-
ing scales reported by Ford et al. [9] and already tested
by some of the authors in a previous work were adopted
[11]. Finally, the risk probability number (RPN) was cal-
culated as the product of O, S and D attributes; for the
failure modes showing higher RPN, thus indicating the
areas of greatest concern in terms of potential risk, add-
itional safety measures aiming at risk mitigation and
process improvement were investigated. As for industrial
applications and already applied in previous FMEA stud-
ies in RT [11,14], the value of 125 was considered as an
RPN threshold below which the risk can be considered
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value, derived form industry, still remains somehow
arbitrary when applied to RT and deserves further
investigation.
The analysis was carried out by a multidisciplinary and
multi-institutional team composed by experts in medical
physics, radiation oncology, radiation dosimetry and
protection, risk management. The operative method-
ology included a preparatory work mainly consisting of
brainstorming in small groups and e-mail exchange,
followed by several plenary meetings organized to delin-
eate and discuss the process tree of the treatment plan-
ning stage, as well as identify the potential failure
modes, causes, effects and conclusive additional safety
measures. The risk indexes associated to each failure
mode were initially conceived by members of the work-
ing group on an individual and independent basis (i.e. in
“blind” mode), then collectively revised during a dedi-
cated plenary session to reach general consensus.The treatment planning stage within the proton beam RT
process
The RT process actually implemented at CNAO, here-
after briefly described, was assumed as a reference for
the detailed definition of the process tree and the esti-
mation of RPN numbers. CNAO is an Italian hospital-
based facility using a synchrotron to accelerate proton
and carbon ion beams [15-17]. Spill-to-spill capability of
beam energy variation, as well as pencil beam scanning
in the transversal plane, are provided as full 3-D active
dose delivery modality. Three rooms with horizontal
(and vertical, in one case) fixed beam lines are available
for patient treatment. Image-based treatment planning
is performed using the commercial Syngo RT Plan-
ning system, version VB10 (Siemens AG Healthcare,
Erlangen, Germany), supporting three different plan
optimization techniques: single field uniform dose
(SFUD), patch fields and 3-D intensity modulated par-
ticle therapy (IMPT) [18]. Once the TPS and radiation
beams were fully commissioned, in September 2011, pa-
tient treatments using proton beams started, while the
beginning of the clinical activity using carbon ions is
very recent (November 2012). So far, about forty adult
patients affected by chordoma, chondrosarcoma or squa-
mous cell carcinoma in the head and neck or spine re-
gion have been treated.
To avoid adding further complexity, in this analysis,
the process tree was defined only considering disease
sites not affected by significant organ motion and in
adult patients, not needing anaesthesia. In particular,
organ motion management and related mitigation tech-
niques for dynamically scanned particle beams, due to
the strong interference effect, are still debated and theirroutine application in the clinical practice is probably
premature [19].
Moreover, as a pre-requirement for this analysis, the TPS
commissioning was assumed as successfully performed.
Results and discussion
The process tree of the treatment planning stage is
shown in Figure 1. Thirty-four sub-processes were iden-
tified, starting from the selection of the reference CT
scan for planning, up to the transfer of the approved
treatment plan to the Oncology Information System
(OIS). Twenty-two of these sub-processes (65% of cases)
were judged to be potentially prone to one or more fail-
ure modes. The O, S and D indexes for each failure
mode were assigned by taking into account the current
specific functionalities of Syngo RT TPS as well as the
following ten main strategies applied in the clinical prac-
tice at CNAO for risk mitigation: (a) definition of de-
tailed site-specific planning protocols and check lists, (b)
refusal of enrolling patients with metallic implants disab-
ling accurate delineation of volumes of interest and/or
creating unacceptable artefacts in planning CT data, (c)
independent double-checking of the main planning
parameters used for each individual patient, (d) treat-
ment plan review by the radiation oncology and the
medical physics staff before plan approval, (e) skill-based
qualitative evaluation of plan robustness, (f ) patient
treatment position reaching in automatic mode, (g) daily
patient set-up verification in the treatment room, (h)
isocenter marking on patient’s thermoplastic mask and
visual check using lasers (CT-simulation and treatment
rooms), (i) regular and successful performing of Depart-
ment QA checks, (j) clinical utilization of TPS restricted
to qualified planners (dosimetrists and medical physi-
cists) who have been trained on its use and limitations.
Following the independent assignment of O, S, and D
values for the identified failure modes by each member
of the working group, global consensus was easily
reached, although a full-day plenary session was needed.
Each index was discussed in detail until definitive score
achievement, starting from the average of the individual
values previously assigned. More than trying to establish
universally reliable and objective assignments of the in-
dexes, the attention of the members was paid to reach a
proper evaluation consistency within all the failure
modes. As already pointed out by the Task Group 100 of
the AAPM [14], the RPN consensus values here reported
should not be regarded as directly applicable to other
centres, unless carefully reviewed by taking into account
local specificities.
Globally, forty-four failure modes were identified. In
twenty-one cases (48%), quite a low RPN value (range:
18–75) was estimated, so these failures were considered
of little concern and reported in Table 1 in a condensed
I. Selection of the reference CT scan for planning
                  Planning 
II. Selection of the lower and upper HU thresholds 
for automatic delineation of external contour 
IV. Delineation of CT artefacts, altered structures, 
metal implants and manual assignment of specific 
HU numbers V. Localization of the origin of coordinates identified by lasers
III. Manual correction of external contour 
VI.  Determination of optimal plan isocenter (PTV 
centre)  VII. Definitive isocenter definition 
VIII. Transfer of definitive isocenter coordinates 
to movable lasers, if different from the origin of 
coordinates
IX. Couch origin of coordinates identification for 
absolute positioning 
X. Creation of the plan and plan name assignment
XI. Target selection and dose prescription for 
each target (dose prescription type – point or 
volume, mean, median, minimum,- total dose, -
fractionation scheme) XII. Creation of the field and field name 
assignment
XIII. Assignment of targets to the each field  
XIV. Definition of plan geometry and fields 
configuration setting of the isocenter position (for 
each field)
XV. Selection of the field direction (gantry angle)
XVI. Selection of field direction (couch rotation)
XVII. Setting of pencil beam parameters: -FWHM,
-scanning step in transversal plane, -energy step, -
passive system 
XVIII. Selection of the physical and biological 
database for dose calculation 
XIX. Definition of dose calculation parameters 
(physical beam model, dose calculation grid, properties 
of the particles per spot matrix, dose calculation 
algorithm, nuclear correction, spot decomposition)
XX. Setting of optimization modality: SFUD or 
IMPTXXI. Definition of cost function and dose 
optimization parameters  
XXII. Initial/iterative definition of target/OAR 
constraints and weights for dose optimization XXIII. Sanity check of the beam parameters 
distribution (e.g. distal and proximal layers for 
each field) XXIV. Inverse planning process starting
XXV. Plan evaluation 
XXVI. Production of competing plans, if needed
XXVII. Evaluation of the best plan XXVIII. Creation of set-up fields and calculation 
of DRRs 
XXIX. Plan review 
XXX. Plan approval
XXXI. Creation of patient verification plan for 
pre-treatment QA: -selection of the phantom, -
selection of geometrical parameters (SSD, gantry 
angle), -RT dose map export, if available
XXXII. Creation of the reports of treatment and 
verification plans 
XXXIV. Treatment plan transfer to the OISXXXIII. Report print-out, check and signing 
Successful planning 
Figure 1 Sub-processes of the treatment planning stage in scanned proton beam radiotherapy.
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metallic markers from body contour and incorrect
localization of the origin of coordinates identified by la-
sers. Among the potential causes of failure for such
minor events, we respectively recognized human error,
lack of communication and inadequate operator skill,
while their effects consisted of wrong dose distribution
(i.e. deviating from the planned one) delivered to the pa-
tient, unintended normal tissue irradiation, target geo-
graphical missing or underdose, low plan robustness and
sub-optimal plan quality.Twenty-three failures modes (52% of cases) were char-
acterized by an RPN score equal to 80 or higher, as
shown in Table 2. The mean values of O, S and D pa-
rameters were 3.6, 6.9 and 4.7, respectively, suggesting
that such events, on average, are infrequent (once or few
times a year) and not too difficult to detect, but poten-
tially severe in terms of patient safety. The threshold of
125 for RPN was exceeded in five cases only. The
highest RPN values, equal to 192 and 196, were associ-
ated to an outdated representation of patient anatomy
and incorrect proton stopping power assignment to
Table 1 Application of failure mode and effects analysis for the treatment planning stage in proton beam radiotherapy
Sub-process Potential failure mode
(III) Manual correction of external contour Lack of removal of metallic skin markers
(V) Localization of the origin of coordinates identified by lasers Incorrect localization of the origin of coordinates identified
by lasers (small amount, 1–2 mm)
Incorrect localization of the origin of coordinates identified
by lasers (large amount)
(VIII) Transfer of definitive isocenter coordinates to
movable lasers if different from the origin of coordinates
Lack of information transfer (no virtual simulation)
Wrong data transfer
Overwrite of file data
(XI) Target selection and dose prescription setting for each target
(dose prescription type - point or volume, mean, median,
minimum, - total dose, - fractionation scheme)
Incomplete target selection
Wrong target selection
Wrong target dose prescription
(XIII) Assignment of targets to the field Incomplete or wrong target assignment
(XIV) Field isocenter position setting Incorrect isocenter definition
(XV - XVI) Selection of field direction (gantry angle and couch
rotation)
Improper selection of gantry angle/couch rotation: tissue interfaces
lying parallel to beam direction, when otherwise avoidable (i.e. when
more robust alternative geometry would be feasible)
Improper selection of gantry angle/couch rotation: not reachable position
(potential collision or movement limitations)
(XVII) Setting of pencil beam parameters:
- Full Width Half Maximum (FWHM) Improper selection of beam parameters: FWHM, scanning or
energy step too low in relationship to the PTV volume
- scanning step in the transversal plane
- energy step
- passive elements (range shifter and ripple filter)
(XVIII) Selection of the physical and biological database
for dose calculation
Selection of unapproved (i.e. not validated for clinical practice,
for experimental use only) database.
(XX) Setting of the optimization modality (SFUD, IMPT) Improper setting of the cost function parameters
Improper selection of optimization modality rather than IMPT
(XXVII) Evaluation of the best plan Improper selection of the best plan among the competing
calculated onces in terms of optimal trade-off between plan
quality (PTV dose coverage versus OAR sparing) and robustness
(XXVIII) Creation of set-up fields and calculation of DRRs Wrong definition of field isocenter (large amount)
Improper selection of parameters for DRR calculation
(XXXI) Selection of the phantom for the verification plan Improper phantom selection
Failure modes having an assigned RPN value lower than 80 are listed.
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metal implants within the planning CT scan, respect-
ively. Both failure modes appeared moderately infre-
quent, potentially severe and difficult to detect.
Three cases (failures n. 7, 8 and 11) could lead to very
severe injuries or even patient death under worst condi-
tions (delivered biological dose approximately deviating
by more than 15% or 10 GyE from the total prescribed
one) and consisted of lack or wrong localization of
couch origin of coordinates by a large amount (more
than 3 mm, corresponding to the typical organ-at-risk
safety margin) and wrong dose fractionation scheme set-
ting. On the other side, the estimated overall RPN for
those failure modes did not exceeded the value of 90, since
they appeared easily detectable by means of plan review,in-room patient set-up verification procedures and pre-
treatment patient-specific dosimetric QA checks.
The most critical sub-process within the treatment
planning stage appeared related to the delineation and
correction of artefacts in planning CT data (n. IV in
Table 2): the high RPN values estimated for the three
failures associated to that sub-process reflect the very
strong sensitivity of particle beams to range uncertain-
ties, unlike in conventional photon RT [20-22]. Potential
causes of these failures are represented by human error
made by the planner and lack of exhaustive clinical
documentation about the previous surgical procedure.
Two additional strategies were suggested by the working
group for risk mitigation. The first one simply consisted
of systematically asking preliminary information to each
Table 2 Application of failure mode and effects analysis for the treatment planning stage in proton beam radiotherapy
Sub-process N Potential failure
mode
Potential causes
of failure
Potential effects
of failure
O S D RPN
(I) Selection of the reference CT scan for planning 1 Error in selecting the
CT scan (e.g. incorrect
patient set up,
outdated
representation of the
anatomy) in case of
multiple CT scans
Human error,
failure in the
communication
between
operators
Wrong dose
distribution/
wrong dose
delivery
3 8 4 96
2 Outdated
representation of the
anatomy (single CT
scan)
Anatomical
changes (related
to time delay)
Wrong dose
distribution/
wrong dose
delivery
3 8 8 192
(III) Manual correction of external contour 3 Incorrect external
contour definition
(body or patient mask
countour
underestimation, i.e.
not fully included in
the external contour)
Human error Wrong dose
distribution /
wrong dose
delivery
4 5 4 80
4 Failure of object/region
identification
Human error Wrong dose
distribution
3 8 4 96
5 Inaccurate delineation Human error Wrong dose
distribution
4 6 6 144(IV) Delineation of CT artefacts, altered structures,
metal implants and manual assignment of specific HU numbers
6 Incorrect HU number
manual assignment
Human error or
lack of
documentation
from the
referring
clinicians (e.g.
surgeons)
Wrong dose
distribution
4 7 7 196
7 Lack of couch origin of
coordinates definition
Human error Unintended
normal tissue
irradiated and
CTV missing
3 10 3 90
(IX) Couch origin of coordinates identification
for absolute positioning
8 Wrong definition of
couch origin of
coordinates (large
amount)
Human error Unintended
normal tissue
irradiated and
CTV missing
3 10 3 90
9 Wrong definition of
couch origin of
coordinates (small
amount, in terms of 2–
3 mm)
Human error Unintended
normal tissue
irradiated and
CTV missing
4 5 6 120
(XI) Target selection and dose prescription for each target
(dose prescription type - point or volume, mean, median,
minimum-, total dose, fractionation scheme)
10 Wrong setting of dose
prescription type
Human error Wrong dose
delivery
3 8 4 96
11 Wrong dose
fractionation setting
Human error and
lack of verbal-
written
communication
(patient chart)
Wrong dose
delivery
2 10 4 80
12 Improper selection of
gantry angle/couch
rotation: beam passing
through OARs, when
otherwise avoidable
Inadequate
operator skill
Sub-optimal
treatment
quality: increased
treatment
toxicity
4 6 4 96
(XV - XVI) Selection of field direction (gantry
angle and couch rotation)
13 Improper selection of
gantry angle/couch
rotation: beam
stopping against OARs,
when otherwise
avoidable
Inadequate
operator skill
Low plan
robustness
(range
uncertainty)
4 8 4 128
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Table 2 Application of failure mode and effects analysis for the treatment planning stage in proton beam radiotherapy
(Continued)
14 Improper selection of
gantry angle/couch
rotation: beam passing
through unstable
tissues (such as bowel),
when otherwise
avoidable
Inadequate
operator skill
Low plan
robustness
(range
uncertainty)
3 8 5 120
(XVII) Setting of pencil beam parameters: 15 Improper selection of
beam parameters:
FWHM, scanning or
energy step too large
in relationship to PTV
volume
Inadequate
operator skill
Sub-optimal
treatment
quality: increased
treatment
toxicity or
reduced TCP
4 5 4 80
- FWHM
- scanning step in the transversal plane
- energy step
- passive elements
(XIX) Definition of dose calculation parameters: 16 Improper selection of
physical beam model
and/or calculation grid
Human error due
to time pressure
or inadequate
skills
Wrong dose
distribution
4 7 5 140
- physical beam model 17 Improper selection of
properties of the
particles per spot
matrix
Human error Sub-optimal
treatment quality
4 4 5 80
- dose calculation grid
- properties of the particles per spot matrix
- dose calculation algorithm, nuclear correction, spot
decomposition
(XX) Setting of the optimization modality (SFUD, IMPT) 18 Improper selection of
IMPT modality
Inadequate
operator skill
Low plan
robustness:
increased
treatment
toxicity or
reduced TCP
4 5 4 80
(XXII) Initial/iterative definition of target/OAR constraints
and weights for dose optimization
19 Wrong or incomplete
definition of one or
more dose constraints
Inadequate
operator skill or
inattention
Sub-optimal
treatment quality
4 8 3 96
(XXV) Plan evaluation 20 Improper acceptance
of results
Time pressure or
inadequate
operator skill
Sub-optimal
treatment quality
5 4 4 80
(XXVI) Production of competing plan 21 Lack of producing
enough competing
plans
Time pressure or
inadequate
operator skill
Sub-optimal
treatment quality
5 4 4 80
(XXVIII) Creation of set-up fields
and calculation of DRRs
22 Wrong definition of
field isocenter (small
amount 2 mm)
Human error Wrong dose
delivery
3 5 8 120
(XXX) Plan approval 23 Approval of wrong
plan
Human error,
failure in the
communication
between
operators
Wrong delivery 3 8 5 120
Failure modes having an assigned RPN ≥80 are reported.
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implanted prosthesis. Secondly, to investigate the utiliza-
tion of dedicated image reconstruction algorithms on
CT/MRI scanners or megavoltage CT imaging to de-
crease the effects of artefacts and allow more accurate
delineation, associated to appropriate material over-
writing, of the artefacts themselves and metal implants.
As a further priority, additional safety measures
were also investigated to mitigate the risk for the
remaining three failure modes (n. 2, 13 and 16)characterized by an RPN higher than 125. Concerning
the outdated representation of patient anatomy, due
to changes occurring in the period between CT scan
and treatment start, the proposed solution simply
consisted of enforcing a short interval time (i.e. not
more than 7–10 days) between the two phases and,
in doubtful cases, plan recalculation on a new CT
scan acquired just a few days before the first treat-
ment session. This latter strategy could at least half
the D index and consequently the RPN itself.
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of beam direction, leading to an otherwise avoidable
situation in which the spread-out-Bragg-peak (SOBP)
stops against one or more organs at risk, the only add-
itional strategy appearing able to significantly reduce the
risk consisted of quantitative evaluation of treatment
plan robustness, that is the determination of the degree
of sensitivity of the plan to the uncertainties involved in
the treatment process. They mainly include range, pa-
tient set-up, dose calculation and delivery deviations.
Nonetheless, that solution did not seem easily and im-
mediately applicable: although several methods (such as
minimax, worst case or multi-criteria optimization,
probabilistic treatment planning) have been recently
proposed for handling the uncertainties in proton ther-
apy [21-26], the inclusion of robustness in the plan
optimization process does not yet represent the state-of-
art of commercial TPSs for protons. Therefore, add-
itional human and technological resources have probably
to be provided to implement those techniques in the
clinical practice. In parallel, the role of Monte Carlo si-
mulations is strongly increasing as a support to TPS
analytical dose calculation engines [23,27]: Monte Carlo
approach seems to represent a flexible modality to ana-
lyse plan robustness, by simulating several combinations
of uncertainties. In this case too, efforts and time are re-
quired to achieve the needed expertise, but at least more
complex plans will benefit of it, in terms of reduced sen-
sitivity to the uncertainties, including those due to bio-
logical effects (i.e. the increase in the RBE at the distal
part of the spread-out-Bragg-peak, while TPSs typically
assume a fixed RBE value equal to 1.1) [23].
Finally, the failure mode related to the improper selec-
tion of physical beam model or dose calculation grid was
recognized as the result of a human error, on its turn
due to time pressure or inadequate skill of the planner.
The implementation of independent methods for dose
calculation, such as again Monte Carlo simulations
[23,27], as well as procedures aiming at plan accuracy
verification under realistic conditions, as recently pro-
posed by Albertini et al. [20], in our opinion could
represent additional strategies to increase both the prob-
ability of failure detection and the levels of attention and
awareness of the planners.
Conclusions
The application of FMEA to the treatment planning
stage in scanned proton beam RT lead to the identifica-
tion and deep investigation of several failure modes; the
assignment of a score assessing the potential risk for
each event allowed to rank these failure modes in order
of importance and define priorities for risk mitigation
with the aim to optimize quality management workflow.
In addition to the safety strategies already adopted in theclinical practice and reported in this work, novel
solutions have been proposed to increase patient safety.
The multi-disciplinary and multi-institutional approach
followed in this study appeared quite useful as a mutual
experience exchange in a relatively new and complex
field, such as actively scanned particle beam RT.
This study was carried out considering the specific
processes implemented at CNAO, therefore, the detailed
definition of failure modes and the assignment of RPN
scores, strongly depend on the specific process under
investigation and on the current strategies/solutions
locally applied. However, the process and fault trees here
delineated can be easily adapted by other users to their
local scenario or, at least, be useful as a starting refer-
ence point, thus minimizing the workload impact of the
FMEA analysis on the involved team.
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